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Using data on franchised chains, which are the type of single-product
entities emphasized in industry dynamics models, we show that age and
size affect growth and survival even after controlling for chain
characteristics and unobserved chain-specific efficiency. This implies
that age and size affect firm growth and survival for reasons other than
those emphasized in learning-type models. We also find that several
chain characteristics affect growth and survival directly, and thus
controlling for firm characteristics is important. Finally, we find that
chain size increases rather than decreases exit among young chains, and
chains converge in size over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE EMPIRICAL MICRO-LEVEL LITERATURE ON FIRM SURVIVAL AND GROWTH has
flourished since Evans [1987a, b] and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson’s
[1988, 1989] early work. This literature has established a number of stylized
facts, including a tendency for large and older firms to grow less rapidly, but
fail less frequently, than young and small firms (see, e.g., Klepper and
Thompson, [2006] for a summary). These stylized facts, in turn, have
stimulated the development of much more theoretical work on firm and
industry dynamics.1
In this paper, we examine the growth and survival of franchised chains.
We focus on these chains for several reasons, starting with the fact that the
retail and service sectors are increasingly important parts of the economy in
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1 See notably Jovanovic [1982], Hopenhayn [1992], Ericson and Pakes [1995], as well as
surveys by Sutton [1997] and Caves [1998]. Cabral andMata [2003] provide a nice summary of
stylized facts on firm size distributions.
developed countries. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
as of December, 2008, about 13 million of the 112.5 million non-farm
employees in the private sector in the U.S. worked in manufacturing,
while 92 million workers were involved in private service industries,
including 15 million in retailing and another 13.3 million in the leisure
and hospitality sector.2 Moreover, most of the productivity growth in the
U.S. since the mid 1990’s has been traced back to improvements in
the efficiency of the wholesale, retail, and service sectors (O’Mahony
and Van Ark [2003]; Bloom et al. [2007]). Yet, with a few exceptions, the
empirical literature on industry dynamics has been almost entirely about
manufacturing firms.3 One goal and motivation of our paper is to examine
whether the same stylized facts, and thus theories of firm and industry
dynamics, are relevant also outside of manufacturing, or whether there is
a need for further theoretical work directed specifically at the retail and
small-scale service sectors.
But why focus on franchised chains as opposed to all retailing? First,
chains are a growingphenomenon in the retail and small-scale service sectors
(see, e.g., Basker and Pham [2007]), and franchising is an important way to
organize such chains.4 In 2005, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers
[2008], franchised businesses accounted for 11million jobs, or 8.1 per cent of
all private non-farm jobs in the U.S. economy.5
Most importantly, however, our interest in franchised chains stems from
the fact that models of firm/industry dynamics typically assume that firms
each produce a single product. Manufacturing firms, whose data have been
used to test themodels, usually are involved in the production of a variety of
products, some of which they abandon over time while introducing others
2 See Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/) – Summary table B. Employ-
ment, hours, and earnings of employees on nonfarm payrolls, seasonally adjusted (ftp://
ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.cessum.txt).
3 Exceptions include some studies of large-scale service providers, namely firms from the
finance, insurance and real estate sectors (e.g., Troske [1996]). Also, Pakes and Ericson [1998]
compare active versus passive learning models and suggest that manufacturing firms engage in
active learning but that passive learning models such as Jovanovic’s [1982] might better
characterize retailing. Petrunia [2007] finds similar results using Canadian firm-level data.
Finally, Audretsch et al. [2004] examine whether Gibrat’s law holds for firms in small-scale
service industries, Foster et al. [2006] analyze productivity growth in retailing and Jarmin et al.
[2004] characterize industry dynamics in U.S. retailing empirically.
4Most of the literature on franchising has focused on issues of organization, namely the
decision to franchise or not, and the terms of franchise contracts. See Blair and Lafontaine
[2005] and Lafontaine and Slade (2007), for overviews of this literature. To our knowledge,
there are no models of industry dynamics that are specific to franchising or, more generally,
chains. However, see Lafontaine and Shaw [1999, 2005] on the relative stability of contracting
practices within chains over time.
5 Business-format franchising, where franchisors provide a ‘way of doing business’ in
exchange for royalties on sales typically, accounts for 9 of these 11million jobs., with the other
type, traditional franchising, providing the remainder. Our data are about business-format
franchises only.
SURVIVAL ANDGROWTH IN RETAIL AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES 543
r 2010 The Authors.
The Journalof IndustrialEconomicsr2010Blackwell PublishingLtd. and theEditorialBoardof TheJournalof IndustrialEconomics.
(Bernard,Redding and Schott [2006, 2010]).6 It is therefore not obvious how
a manufacturer’s age relates to its experience at producing a particular
product, nor how its total size relates to its sales of a particular product at a
point in time. In fact, manufacturing firms, like many retail firms,
continuously modify their product mix in order to continue to grow and
avoid failure. This possibility is absent from most theoretical models.7
Franchised chains, on the other hand, are fundamentally ‘single-product’
entities as the set of products offered is relatively constant over time, and
chosen centrally by the franchisor.8 In fact, the value of a franchise depends
on a strong association between the brand and the set of products and
services [or product mix] that customers expect to find at each outlet.9While
they make small adjustments over time, franchised chains rarely make
fundamental changes to their product offerings, and the issue of consistency
or uniformity across outlets is paramount to these chains.10 Further, with
franchisee ownership of individual outlets, substantial change is especially
difficult to implement in franchised chains compared to corporate chains
such as Starbucks, for example.11 Thus, for franchised chains, either the
concept developed early on andassociatedwith the brand remains successful
in the market, and the chain grows via cloning of the concept in different
locations, or it does not, and the chain stops growing, or even exits.
We rely on the strong association between brand and products in
franchised chains to argue that a chain’s age and size capture exactly the type
of product-specific learning emphasized by most of the theories. As a result,
our data on franchised chains allow us to provide better tests of the
predictions from the single-product models of firm dynamics than the
empirical literature has produced so far.
Our panel data set on franchised chains offers several other advantages
relative to manufacturing data sets used in the literature. First, we know
several things about each franchised chain in our data besides its age and
size.Hence, we can examine how the introduction of other observed ‘firm’ or
chain characteristics, as well as chain unobserved heterogeneity, modifies
6 See also Gort [1962] for earlier evidence on this topic.
7Recently, Mitchell [2000], Klepper and Thompson [2006], Bernard et al. [2006, 2010] and
Nocke and Yeaple [2006] have proposed models of firm dynamics where firms engage in more
than one activity.
8We use the words ‘product’ or ‘business format’ or ‘concept’ interchangeably to mean the
menu of product options offered at each outlet in a chain.
9 Some large franchise companies offer a variety of ‘product’ options through the different
franchise chains that they own and operate. This is the case for example for Choice Hotels
International, which owns Comfort Inn, MainStay Suites, Econo Lodge and several other
chains, and forYum!Brands Inc., the largest fast-food restaurant company in theworld, which
owns brands such as KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell and several others and finally, Service Brands
International, owner of Molly Maid and Mr. Handyman, among others.
10 See, e.g., Blair and Lafontaine [2005], chapter 5, and Bradach [1998] on the importance of
uniformity.
11 For an excellent case study reflecting this reality, see Kaufmann [1987].
544 RENÁTA KOSOVÁ AND FRANCINE LAFONTAINE
r 2010 The Authors.
The Journal of IndustrialEconomicsr2010Blackwell PublishingLtd. and theEditorialBoardof The Journalof IndustrialEconomics.
results pertaining to the impact of chain age and size. These analyses are
important because in a Jovanovic [1982] learning-type model, firm age and
size affect survival rates and growth exactly because they capture the
intrinsic ‘efficiency’ of the firm. Evans [1987a, b], however, suggests that
theories of firm growth should be expanded to consider how other factors
besides age and size might play a role. In addition, Klepper and Thompson
[2006] note that the significant effects of age and size on growth and exit in
the empirical literature may arise because of other factors correlated with
these variables that are omitted from the empirical models. Consistent with
these arguments, in their seminal work, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson
[1989] included ownership type, industry and year effects, aswell as the effect
of initial plant size in their empirical model of plant survival and growth.
They found that ownership type had a large effect on the relationship
between size and growth. By 2003, however,Geroski et al. still pointed to the
lack of firm fixed effects and other firm characteristics as a major deficiency
of the current empirical literature on firm and industry dynamics. Thus,
besides providingmore relevant tests of the theoretical predictions, a second
important question we can answer is whether age and size still matter once
we include other firm characteristics in the empirical model, and control for
efficiency or chain unobserved heterogeneity directly.
Lastly, our data set on franchised chains represents a much longer panel
than is typical in the empirical firm dynamics literature. This means that we
can analyze a third main question in this literature, namely whether age and
size effects differ for mature chains, as predicted by learning-based theories.
We find first that, even after controlling for chain unobserved correlated
heterogeneity (or chain fixed effects) and various chain characteristics, the
impact of age and size on chain growth, and the impact of age on chain
survival, are consistent with findings in prior studies. This is despite the fact
that such studies focused mostly on manufacturing firms/establishments,
and did not control for firm unobserved heterogeneity. Our results imply
that the unknown production efficiency of a firm, and the subsequent
learning process posited by Jovanovic-like learningmodels, are not the only,
nor perhaps the main, reason for the empirical relationships found between
firm age and size on the one hand, and firm exit and growth on the other
hand. Moreover, since these age and size effects are robust to the
introduction of contract variables and other controls, we can conclude that
these chain characteristics are not driving the age and size effects either.
Second, we find that controlling for chain unobserved correlated
heterogeneity is crucial as it reverses the impact of size on chain survival.
The finding that larger size increases the likelihood of failure ‘within’ chains
–while the opposite is true cross-sectionally in our data as well as in previous
studies – is intriguing as it is inconsistent with the implications of most
theoreticalmodels.Whenwe focus onmature chains, however, neither chain
age nor size has a statistically significant effect on exit rates. Thus the positive
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effect of chain size on exit within chains is a young firm effect.We believe this
result is best explained by a tendency of young chains to be too aggressive
early on and make ‘mistakes’ – or over-optimistic assessments about their
odds of success in the market.12 In that sense, our findings relate to the large
literature on overconfidence in finance and entrepreneurship. Moreover,
organizational features of franchised chains likely contribute further to this
tendency formistakes and overconfidence as franchisees [not the franchisor]
bear most of the cost of outlet failures.
Finally, our analyses of mature chains show that chain age affects growth
negatively in all but the oldest subset of chains [greater than 30 years in
franchising] and chain size has a significant, though small, negative effect on
growth rates in all subsets. Together with the findings above, these results
imply that franchised chains converge in size to chain-specific levels, a
tendency that has not been so apparent in studies of manufacturing firms. In
other words, when we focus on single-product entities, there is a limit to size
as predicted by Jovanovic [1982] and many other models of firm dynamics.
This limit, not surprisingly, is product or ‘concept’ specific, reflecting, in our
view, the differences in demand for the product concepts of the chains.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review
related literature and provide a framework for our empirical analyses. In
Section III we describe our data on franchised chains and address several
issues that arise in measuring growth and exit in this context. In Section IV,
we present our empirical model and results. Section V concludes.
II. FRANCHISING AND INDUSTRY DYNAMICS
The early literature on firm growth emphasized the predictions of Gibrat’s
law, which implicitly focused on the growth of surviving firms.13 Many
models of industry dynamics have been proposed since as authors have tried
to explain the stylized facts arising from empirical analyses of entry, exit and
growth at the firm or establishment level. Jovanovic [1982] developed a
model based on self-selection, where firms are endowed at birth with an
unknown efficiency parameter that they learn about as they operate in
perfectly competitive industries. Relying largely on this framework, Dunne,
Roberts and Samuelson [1988, 1989] argued that the hazard of firm exit
should be decreasing in firm age and size.14 As for firm growth, predictions
were less clear: for non-failing firms, holding age (size) fixed, the mean
12We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this result.
13Gibrat’s law amounts to an assumption that firm growth in each period is proportional to
its current size. This, in turn, implies that the firm growth rate is random and the size
distribution of firms is lognormal in the limit. See, e.g., Sutton [1997], Cabral andMata [2003],
Geroski et al. [2003], Audretsch et al. [2004] or Petrunia [2008].
14However see Pakes and Ericson [1998] for an example of functional form that results in an
exit hazard function that is initially increasing in age.
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growth rate should at some point decreasewith size (age). For all firms, then,
the net effect of age and size on growth would depend on the importance of
the reduction in failure rate compared to the reduction in the growth rate of
non-failing firms. Evans [1987a], however, argued that the effect of firm age
on growth should be negative in Jovanovic’s model if output were convex in
managerial inefficiency.15
Jovanovic’s [1982] model has been extended in several ways. Jovanovic
and Rob [1987] in particular consider the effect of firm size on survival and
growth when single-product firms compete in differentiated rather than
homogeneous product markets. They assumed that in the course of doing
business, firms gather information from their customers which they can use
to improve their product. The larger a firm is, the more information it
obtains, and the better it can tailor its product to the market. Thus success
feeds on itself, so that firm size should be positively correlated over time, and
could be unbounded if the firm successfully improved its product over time.
Recent models by Sutton [1997, 1998], Mitchell [2000], Klepper and
Thompson [2006], Bernard, Redding and Schott [2006, 2010], and Nocke
and Yeaple [2006] specifically allow firms to engage simultaneously in more
than one activity.16 Because of limited factors of production such as
managerial talent (Bernard et al.) or organizational capability (Nocke and
Yeaple), or because of lack of information and resulting communication
problems (Mitchell) or the finite duration of submarkets (Klepper and
15 In the empirical literature, firm age and size enter the specifications for firm growth and
survival because they reflect some type of firm learning process and/or firm type. Cooley and
Quadrini [2001] point out, however, that the basic Jovanovic type of learning model cannot
generate the kind of simultaneous dependence on both size and age that has been found in the
empirical literature (e.g., Evans [1987a, b] and Hall [1987]). Similarly in Hopenhayn’s [1992]
model, size is a sufficient statistic for firm type and thus age has no extra predictive role. To
generate the implication that firm size has a negative impact on a firm’s growth rate when one
controls for firm age, and vice versa, Cooley andQuadrini [2001] rely on amodel that combines
persistent shocks to firm productivity, as in Jovanovic [1982], with financial market frictions.
The drawback of their model, however, as Klepper and Thompson [2006] point out, is that it
does not generate any prediction as to the effect of firm age on the probability of exit. Clementi
and Hopenhayn [2006], however, develop a model with endogenous financing constraints
whose implications are consistent with all the stylized facts on the impact of age/size on firm
growth and survival. The authors point out that the main advantage of their model compared,
for example, to Jovanovic [1982] orHopenhayn [1992] is not that it yields new implications, but
that it is technically simpler and gives a role to capital structure.
16Klepper and Thompson [2006] elaborate on Sutton’s [1998] idea where firm growth
opportunities arise from the creation of new submarkets. Though this notion of submarket
may be appealing as a way to think of the operations of a franchise chain across geographic
markets, the specific characteristics the authors ascribe to their submarkets do not apply to our
setting. First, their submarkets come into existence and then ultimately disappear. Though this
may describe well new markets arising from new technologies, per the theory of product life
cycle, it does not fit the notion of geographic regions as these usually do not disappear. Second,
in their model, the more submarkets a firm participates in, the greater the scope or diversity of
product offerings. As we have already explained, in our data increased geographical
distribution does not represent greater product diversity, but rather increased scale. In their
model, scale remains constant during each submarket’s lifetime.
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Thompson), these models all imply limits to firm scope. But while the
Klepper and Thompson and the Nocke andYeaple models also imply limits
to ‘overall’ firm size, other models are less conclusive on this issue. By
contrast, themodels that focus on single-product entities – like the franchise
chains whose data we rely on – usually imply that these should face such a
limit. This occurs because the ‘firm’s’ efficiency level determines its optimal
scale of production. As noted by Bernard et al. [2006], ‘Further research is
needed into the respective roles of firms’ intensive (how much of each
product is produced) and extensive (how many products are produced)
margins in firm growth’ (p. 23). Our chain-level analyses represent the first
attempt at exploring the factors that affect the intensive margin (or scale) of
firm growth.
To our knowledge, there are no models of industry dynamics that
are specific to franchising or chains. Pakes and Ericson [1998] contrast
Jovanovic’s passive learning model and its implications with those derived
from Ericson and Pakes’ [1995] model where firms engage in active research
and exploration. Using data on Wisconsin firms, the authors find that
passive learning better describes retailing firmswhile active learning seems to
better characterizemanufacturing firms. They reach this conclusion because
the firm size distribution changes much less, and gets closer to the cross-
sectional size distribution much faster, in retail than in manufacturing. In
line with arguments that we present below, one justification for their finding
is that retailers typically face amore local demand, andhence amore binding
constraint on their size, than manufacturers do. Foster, Haltiwanger and
Krizan [2006] similarly point to the importance of location and ownership
structure as potential sources of differences between retailing and
manufacturing, suggesting that firm age and size may not affect survival
and growth in the same way in both sectors of the economy. And indeed
growth over time via the addition of outlets in differentmarkets, as occurs in
the type of retail and service chains we focus on, may not generate the same
‘learning’ as would growth over timewithin a plant or amanufacturing firm.
In particular, adding more outlets typically means signing new contracts
with existing or new franchisees, and growing the chain geographically in
ways that might exacerbate agency problems within the chain and thus
reduce the chain’s efficiency. As a result, chain age (and size) may not have
the same effect on survival or growth in our data as formanufacturing firms.
We explore these issues below, after describing our data in the next section.
III. DATA ANDMEASUREMENT
Our 1980–2001 chain-level data come from twomain sources: From 1980 to
1992 inclusively, we rely on the Entrepreneurmagazine’s ‘Annual Franchise
500’ surveys. Starting with the 1993 data, we use the Source Book of
Franchise Opportunities, now called Bond’s Franchise Guide, as this source
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gives more detailed information on each franchised chain. Both of these
sources provide information for about 1,000 franchised chains each year.17
But while the number of chains is rather stable from year to year in the
sources, the dataset itself is quite unbalanced. Specifically, our data set
contains 22,216 yearly observations for 5,044 different franchised chains,
i.e., about four observations per chain on average (see the data appendix for
more information on how we arrived at this sample and its composition).
The population of franchisors in the U.S., in contrast, has been estimated at
about 2,500 franchisors throughout the same period. The much larger
number of franchisors in our data is duemostly to entry and exit. Indeed, we
see more than 200 new chains starting to franchise each year throughout the
1980’s. Of these, only about 40 per cent continue franchising after ten years,
and only 30–35 percent after 15 years.18 Our panel is unbalanced, however,
also due to missing data for 1999, a year when our data source was not
published, and because we have been fairly conservative in matching chains
across years. Specifically, if we could not find a reliable match in terms of
name and address, we assumed the data were for a different chain. Finally,
random non-responses, or the fact that some chains that answered the
survey one yearmay not have responded the next year, also contribute to the
unbalanced nature of our data.
For each franchisor, our data include information on: 1) the number of
company-owned and franchised outlets each year, 2) the year when a
franchisor started the business and the year it started franchising, 3) royalty
rates, advertising rates, franchise fees and ongoing fixed payments, and 4)
franchisor’s characteristics including the amount of capital required to open
an outlet, the state (or country if Canada) where it is headquartered, and the
type of business it is involved in.
The fact that most franchised chains develop their franchise programs
after experimenting with one or a few corporate outlet(s) for a certain
amount of time, and that franchisors usually operate some of their outlets
corporately even once they become established franchised companies,
affects how onemaymeasure chain ‘age’ and ‘size’ and define its growth and
survival.19 We describe how we measure each of these, and all other
variables, in the remainder of this section.
III(i). Measuring Exit and Growth
Wedetermine the chain exit year by finding the last year inwhich the chain is
listed in either of our main sources, or in a third franchise directory, the
17The data for a given year are from the following year’s edition as both sources are
published early in the year.
18 The average duration for chains with complete spells in our data is eight years. See Blair
and Lafontaine [2005], Chapter 2, for more discussion.
19 See Lafontaine and Shaw [2005] and Blair and Lafontaine [2005] for more on this.
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Franchise Annual.20 When a chain is no longer found in any of these, it is
deemed to have exited franchising the year after it last appeared in any of
them.21 Once we identify the year of exit, we allow a 2-year prior to exit
window to incorporate the delays in reporting and mismatch between the
true time of exit from franchising andwhatwe considered the time of exit for
data matching purposes.22
Some exits in our data may reflect cases where chains are bought by other
franchisors that then consolidate all their holdings in a single chain.
Fortunately, chains that are purchasedmost often continue to be developed
and listed separately in the directory. Of course these should not, and will
not, appear as exits in our data. If the buyer instead decides to discontinue
the use of the purchased brand and consolidate the outlets with those of their
existing chains, or just discontinue them, the buyouts should be, and are,
counted as exits in our data.23
Given our methodology to identify exits, an exit may mean that the chain
has ceased to franchise, or ceased to exist altogether. According to the
USDOC [1988: 12–13), among chains that exit franchising, roughly half
choose to stop franchising. In other words, the firm decides that franchising
is not right for them. These chains then typically either close down or ‘buy
back’ franchised outlets, and continue to operate from that point on as
wholly-owned (i.e., vertically integrated) chains.24 The other half of the
chains that stop franchising, according to the USDOC, cease all operations
so no outlets remain in business.
Based on this information, we expect that about half of the exits in our
data will be cases where all operations cease (failure) while the other half
would represent cases where firms decided that franchising was not right for
them. Note that according to Trutko et al. [1993], initial franchise
development costs for franchisors can exceed $500,000.25 This amount
includes expenses incurred to develop clear and complete operating
manuals, contracts, disclosure documents and so on, as well as franchise
20We relied also on various internet sites, including individual franchisor and franchisee
sites, to resolve ambiguous cases, especially towards the end of our sample period.
21 See Shane [1996] and Lafontaine and Shaw [1998, 1999] who also used this approach.
22 Specifically, if the year of exit from franchising for chain A was 1999, but the last year its
datawere availablewas 1997,we assumed that the chain exited franchising in 1997 andascribed
the 1997 data to its exit year.
23 Shane [1996] contacted the founders of the 138 chains in his sample and verified that none
had been acquired or had changed names, confirming that such events are quite rare.
24 To our knowledge, only two studies have examined why chains that continue to operate
choose to stop franchising. These studies were based on fairly small samples, one conducted in
the U.K. construction industry (Kirby and Watson [1999]) and the other in Australia with a
convenience sample of franchisors (Frazer [2001]. These studies suggest that chains mainly
discontinue franchising due to difficulties in recruiting and monitoring franchisees to ensure
performance. Frazer [2001] also finds that the economic climate affects these decisions.
25 See Stanworth et al. [1998] for further data and discussion on this topic.
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sales staff development and training. Since these amounts are substantial, we
do not expect the decision to begin and exit franchising to be made lightly.
Focusing on the franchising component of the chains, we set exit from
franchising (FExitt) equal to 1 in the year when the chain disappears from all
our franchising directories and 0 otherwise. In total, we find 1,409 cases of
exit from franchising in our data. We define franchising growth (FGrowtht)
as the proportional change in the number of (only) franchised outlets in the
chain, namely:
ð1Þ FGrowtht ¼ 100  ðFranchisedOutletstþ1
 FranchisedOutletstÞ=FranchisedOutletst
and set FGrowtht 5  100% when FExitt 5 1.26 This measure, like all our
dependent variables, is forward looking. This is because in the theoretical
models, firms decide on their output (and thus growth), and whether to exit
or not, at the beginning of period tþ 1 based on the information available
at time t.
Since franchised chains also include company-owned outlets, and can exit
franchising but continue to operate as corporate entities, to provide a
complete picture of chain dynamics, we also measure chain growth in terms
of the change in total outlets (TGrowtht):
ð2Þ TGrowtht ¼ 100  ðTotalOutletstþ1
 TotalOutletstÞ=TotalOutletst
where Total Outletst 5Franchised OutletstþCompany-Owned Outletst.
Thoughwedonot have direct informationonwhether the chain continues to
exist or whether it fails altogether after it stops franchising, we can ascertain
whether it has any company-ownedoutlets at the time it leaves franchising.27
In those cases where a chain has none, we assume that stopping franchising
also implies going out of business, and we set ‘total exit’ (TExitt) equal to 1,
and TGrowtht equal to  100. We have only 341 such exits, reflecting the
fact that about one quarter of franchisors in our data are fully franchised
(i.e., have no company outlets).28 Given the small number of exits we obtain
26There are 1,454 cases where FGrowth5  100 but only 1,409 cases when FExit5 1,
because the chain has not exited franchising according to our definition. In other words, these
chains close down or convert all their franchised outlets, so their franchise growth isminus 100,
but they still appear in franchise directories. These observations are treated as being censored at
the value  100 in the growth analyses, but not as exits in the exit regressions.
27We could use Yellow Pages to determine if we can still find outlets operating under the
trade name today, for example, but no data source would allow us to go back to 1980 and track
them over time to determine when exactly all outlets cease to exist if they do.
28 Estimates from the literature suggest that about one out of every four franchisors has no
corporate unit. Thus our sample, with 341 such firms out of 1,409, is not unusual in this. See
Blair and Lafontaine [2005] for more on this.
SURVIVAL ANDGROWTH IN RETAIL AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES 551
r 2010 The Authors.
The Journalof IndustrialEconomicsr2010Blackwell PublishingLtd. and theEditorialBoardof TheJournalof IndustrialEconomics.
with this definition, we interpret this measure as a lower bound on chains’
actual business failure, whereas we view exit from franchising (FExit, as
defined above) as an upper bound measure of the same. In those cases when
the chain no longer is found in any of our directories, we have no data to
measure its growth post exit from franchising. Thus we treat TGrowtht as
missing and the observation as censored in the survival analyses.
We exclude from our sample the few observations where chain growth is
above 500%, as we suspect that these are due to coding errors or overly
optimistic forecasts.29 Due to this, and to differences in definitions, the
sample sizes differ depending onwhether wemeasure only the franchising or
all operations of the chain, as shown in our summary statistics in Table I.
Most of the reduction in sample size from our initial 22,216 observations,
however, is due to the requirement that we have at least two data points per
chain to measure growth or survival as well as additional data cleaning and
missing values for some control variables (see the data appendix).
Table I
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name (Definition) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Exit from Franchising (FExit) 15404 0.09 0.29 0 1
Exit from Business (TExit) 14445 0.02 0.15 0 1
Growth in Franchised Outlets, in %
(FGrowth)w
15404 10.30 68.67  100 500zz
Growth in Total Outlets, in % (TGrowth)ww 14445 14.52 52.16  100 500zz
Survivor FGrowth 13995 21.41 61.98  100z 500zz
Survivor TGrowth 14104 17.29 49.61  94.03 500zz
Size – Franchised Outlets (in 10s) 15404 17.51 66.08 0 2053.1
Size – Total Outlets (in 10s) 14445 21.88 80.61 0.1 2658.8
Age – Years in Franchising 15404 10.99 9.92 1 76
Age – Years in Business 14445 17.60 15.11 1 174
Business Experience Before Franchising 15404 6.64 11.17 0 165
Percent Company Owned Outlets 15404 20.23 26.67 0 100
Canadian 15404 0.11 0.32 0 1
Franchise Fee ($100K) 15404 0.20 0.13 0 3
Capital Required ($100K) 15404 1.89 6.57 0 290
Royalty Rate (% of sales) 15404 4.97 2.70 0 30
Advertising Fee (% of sales) 15404 1.57 1.78 0 15
Monthly Ongoing Fixed Fee ($000) 15404 0.04 0.23 0 6.25
w:5  100 if FExit5 1; ww:5  100 if TExit5 1
z:  100% occurs for those chains that cancelled all franchised outlets, but are not exitors according to the data
sources, so FGrowth5  100%, even though FExit5 0.
zz: Observations with growth rates above 500% are excluded from the sample. See text.
29 This eliminates 131 observations for FGrowth, and 59 observations for TGrowth.Most of
these are for very small franchisors. Since some of the survey data is not verified by the
publication, we suspect that these very high growth rates were due to typos or forecasts rather
than the actual information that franchisors were supposed to report.
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III(ii). Chain Age and Size
The fact that franchised chains usually are comprised of both corporate and
franchised outlets also affects how one measures their age and size. In all
analyses, when our dependent variables are for the franchising component
of the chain, we measure chain size by its number of franchised outlets only.
When the dependent variables refer to both corporate and franchised
operations, we measure chain size using total outlets, franchised and
company owned.30 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, franchised chains
usually begin their businesses by operating at least one outlet corporately for
a few years before they start franchising. As a result, we also measure chain
age in two ways: as the number of years that the firm has been franchising,
and as the number of years since it started its first companyoutlet.Weuse the
former in regressions where our dependent variables are about the
franchising component of the chains only, and the latter when the dependent
variables are about total chain operations.
While in theoretical models of firm dynamics, age and size often are
viewed as equivalent summary statistics for ‘firm efficiency/productivity,’
and empirically these variables are usually highly correlated, in our data the
correlations are 0.33 between years of franchising and number of franchised
outlets, and 0.25 for the ‘total-chain’ measures. This is because we have
many old chains that are still small, and large chains among the very young
as well. Though there is a general tendency to associate franchising mostly
with established chains, the reality is that the majority of franchised chains
are quite young. In our sample,more than 50per cent of the chains are young
(7 or less years in franchising). Table I shows descriptive statistics for all the
variables above in our final samples, as well as all the control variables,
described in the next section, that are not series of dummy variables.
III(iii). Control Variables
As mentioned in our introduction, there has been some concern in the
literature that the significant effects of age and size on growth and exit may
30While the theoretical models are about output levels, many empirical studies use sales or
revenues as a measure of output. We believe that measuring chain size via the physical number
of outlets is preferable in our context for several reasons. First, the number of outlets is a
measure that the chains and trade press emphasize a lot; second, sales and value added can
differ importantly in retailing. In other words, higher sales do not necessarily imply higher
levels of ‘real output’ or economic activity (e.g., sales in a travel agency vs. a car dealership, or
luxury vs. economyhotel chains). Thenumber of outlets in a chain, however, captures variation
in output levels quite well, not only across industries, but also between and within the chains in
the same industry. Finally, we prefer the number of outlets also to an alternative – employment
– used in some studies. We do not have outlet/chain employment data, but if we did we would
hesitate to use this because, unlike the situation in manufacturing, many retail chains rely on
seasonal workers and thus employment figures may suffer from serious measurement errors.
See, e.g., Lafontaine and Sivadasan [2009] for analyses of labor costs in fast-food and their
variability over time (and across countries).
SURVIVAL ANDGROWTH IN RETAIL AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES 553
r 2010 The Authors.
The Journalof IndustrialEconomicsr2010Blackwell PublishingLtd. and theEditorialBoardof TheJournalof IndustrialEconomics.
be due to other factors correlated with these variables but omitted from the
analyses. Indeed, as emphasized still by Geroski et al. [2003], few authors
have analyzed how firm characteristics beside age and size, including firm
unobserved [by the econometrician] heterogeneity,might affect survival and
growth, or how thesemight affect the observed relationship between a firm’s
age and size and its survival and growth.31
Fortunately, the rich panel nature of our data allows us to control for both
observed and unobserved firm characteristics. We explain further in our
methodology section how we incorporate firm unobserved heterogeneity in
our linear and non-linear estimations. Here, we discuss howwe control for the
impact of other observed (and thus directly measurable) chain characteristics
besides size and age, aswell as the impact of other factors thatmay affect chain
dynamics. This is important not only because it addresses a deficiency in the
empirical literature, as just noted, but also because in the literature on
franchising, authors have examined how contracting practices – such as the
extent to which a chain relies on company ownership versus franchising and
the terms of franchise contracts – affect firm performance, where the latter
often is measured in terms of firm growth and survival.32
Our data include both time-varying chain characteristics as well as some
characteristics that donot vary over timewithin chains.Among the first set,we
have annual data on the franchise contract terms for each chain. These are
expected to affect the profitability of a chain and thus the financial positionof a
franchisor, aswell as franchisees, and thus the incentives to grow the chain and
remain involved in franchising.33 Franchise contract terms include the royalty
and advertising rates, both of which are usually stated and calculated as a
percentage of outlet sales. They also include two types of fixed fees, namely the
upfront franchise fees that franchisors typically request once, at the beginning
of the 15 to 20 year franchise relationship, as well as, in some cases, ongoing
fixed payments which are requested instead of, or in addition to, royalties or
advertising fees based on sales. We measure both types of fixed fees in
thousandsofnominalU.S. dollars, butongoingfixed fees are further expressed
as per month requirements.
In addition to contract terms, we have data on the amount of capital
required to open an outlet and on the proportion of company-owned outlet
in each chain, both of which can change from one year to the next. We
31To our knowledge, only Disney et al. [2003] and Jarmin et al. [2004] have followed suit at
least to some degree – similarly as Dunne et al. [1989] both studies controlled for whether an
establishment belongs to a single or multi-unit firm.
32 See notably Shane [1996], Lafontaine and Shaw [1998] and Azoulay and Shane [2001].
33 In Jovanovic’smodel, firms learn/update their expectations about their efficiency based on
profits earned at the end of each period. Thus onlymore profitable firms grow and survive. The
importance of financial resources for firm growth and survival is documented in a vast
literature in finance. For details on franchise contracts, and their role in affecting the
performance of franchised businesses, see Lafontaine [1992] and Blair and Lafontaine [2005].
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include the former, also expressed in thousands of nominal U.S. dollars, to
control for potential differences in outlet sizes across chains. As for the
proportion of company-owned outlets, Lafontaine and Shaw [2005] discuss
how franchisors try to achieve a stablemix of franchised vs. company-owned
units in the long run, which affects whether more franchised or company
outlets will be opened in any given year, and thus might differentially affect
our twomeasures of chain growth and exit. Further, to avoid possible biases
due to common macro-economic shocks – e.g. changes in aggregate
demand, inflation, institutional/regulatory changes, and so on – that could
drive chain growth or failure over time, we include a series of yearly dummy
variables in all our regressions.
The chain characteristics that are constant over time in our data include
first the state in which the franchisor’s headquarter is located. We use this
to generate a series of dummy variables that we include in our empirical
model because smaller franchisors tend operate outlets mostly in their state
of headquarter, and different states have different regulations for franchised
businesses. These dummy variables also control for location-specific
fixed effects (e.g., different demographics or weather across states) that
may affect chain growth or survival. Since our data include both U.S. and
Canadian franchisors, we also include a separate Canadian franchisor
dummy variable to control for different business and regulatory conditions
between the two countries.
Since chains that operate for a longer period of time before becoming
involved in franchising can benefit from the reputation, business acumen or
pool of customers developed during this period, in regressions focusing on
franchised only versions of our dependent variables, we also control for the
number of years that the chain was in operation before it started franchising
(Business Experience5Years in BusinessYears in Franchising).
Finally, for each chain, we know the type of activities that it is engaged in,
which we classify among 23 sectors (see Appendix Table AI). We include a
series of sector dummy variables in all our regressions to control for
unobserved (to the econometrician) sector-specific factors, such as, for
example, different levels of demand for the product, different levels of
competition, or different cost factors (e.g., issues related to specific inputs,
types of human capital requirements, particular types of location require-
ments, and so on). Ultimately, we control for unobserved chain-specific
heterogeneity via themethodology described in Section IV(ii), which further
alleviates concerns that differences within sectors or chain-specific variation
(e.g., hotel vs. bagel shop) might affect our results.
Table AI, in the appendix, shows descriptive statistics for all our variables
on a per sector basis. It makes clear that there is much variation across
sectors, startingwith the number of franchised chains per sectorwhich varies
from a low of just 20 to 30 chains (in the Repair and Travel sectors) to a high
ofmore than 400 chains (in the fast food, or Eating Places – Limited Service,
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Retail – Other and in the Business Services sectors). In addition, the table
shows sizable differences in the characteristics of chains across sectors. For
example, average chain size is much greater, at more than 300 outlets per
chain, in theMaintenance, Hotels andMotels, and fast-food sectors, than in
the Education, Personal Services or Contractors sectors where chains have
on average fewer than 100 outlets. Average chain age also differs
importantly across sectors. Similarly for the proportion of company-owned
outlets, which varies from 7.4% (Travel) to 31.7% (Eating Places – Full
Service), as well as other contract terms. Given this variation, we conclude
that controlling for unobserved sectoral differences in our analyses is
important, as our estimates would be biased otherwise. And indeed,
consistent with our expectations, in all regressions where we can separate
their impact from unobserved chain heterogeneity, we find that the sectoral
dummy variables are jointly significant. As described further below, to
verify the robustness of our results, we also carried out several sectoral
analyses. We found those to be qualitatively equivalent to the results we
present below.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
IV(i). Cross Sectional Data Patterns
We begin our analyses of the relationship between chain age and size and
their survival and growth by showing cross-sectional means in Figures 1–4.
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between average growth rates
and chain size and age, grouped by cohorts.34 The first panel in each
figure considers Total Growth (TGrowth) as a function of total years in
business or total outlets, while the second panel shows growth in
Franchising (FGrowth) as a function of years in franchising or number of
franchised outlets.
Figures 1 and 2 show a systematic negative relationship between growth
rates and both age and size, whether we focus on the overall, or just the
franchising components, of the chains.
Figures 3 and 4 show the relationships between exit rates and chain age
and size respectively. These also show a decreasing proportion of chains
exiting as they become better established along either the age (negative
duration dependence) or size dimension. For both growth and exit, the
effects are much smaller, however, after the chains have achieved some level
of maturity or size. Since these figures only show average growth and exit
34Age cohorts are defined as 1: 1 year, 2: 2–3 years, 3: 4–6 years, 4: 7–10 years, 5: 11–15 years,
6: 16–20 years, 7: 21–30 years, 8: 31–40 years, 9: 41–50 years, 10: 51–70, 11: 71þ years. As for
size, we use 1: 1–2 outlets, 2: 3–5 outlets, 3: 6–10 outlets, 4: 11–20 outlets, 5: 21–30 outlets, 6: 31–
50 outlets, 7: 51–100 outlets, 8: 101–200 outlets, 9: 201–300 outlets, 10: 301–500, 11: 501–1000,
12: 1001þ outlets.
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rates as a function of chain age and size without taking into account the
impact of other factors, we now turn to duration and growth rate analyses
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IV(ii) Chain Growth
Our measures of growth have a lower bound at –100%, when chains exit,
indicating left censoring in the data. We therefore estimate the growth
equation using a Tobit model. However, although in general the linear
models (fixed and random effects) provide inconsistent estimates when the
dependent variable is censored as it is here, they still provide a useful
benchmark for the marginal effects near the population means without
imposing the distributional assumptions that the Tobit model requires (e.g.,
seeWooldridge [2002]). Alsowhen censoring is low, the bias in linearmodels
is negligible. For these reasons, we also present results from standard linear
fixed-effects estimation. To highlight the similarity between Tobit and the
linear fixed-effects estimates, we report estimated coefficients from theTobit
regressions. The (unreported) marginal effects in Tobit, evaluated at sample
means, were almost identical to the reported coefficients.
Unobserved differences across chains, especially differences in product
type, product quality or appeal, may bias our estimates if we do not control
for chain-specific heterogeneity. For example, the long-run demand for
niche products such as bubble tea shops is likely to be lower than for more
mainstream products such as coffee shops. When franchisors develop new
products or explore new niches, they cannot know ahead of time whether a
new product category will turn out to be a fad (e.g., restaurants catering to
followers of the Atkins diet), nor how much competition they will face
ultimately in their product categories (e.g., bagel shops). Chain-specific
effects control for all such prior expectations for a franchised chain at the
time of entry. They also control for unobserved differences across chains in
monitoring practices and intensity of agency problems, the timing of entry
relative to other chains in the same industry, differences in access to capital
or technology that may arise from a chain’s belonging to a larger franchise
company or not, or any other differences in initial conditions. In particular,
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Exit Rates as a Function of Chain Size
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portfolio may be affected not only by the chain’s characteristics, but also by
the franchising firms’ profitmaximization process across its multiple chains/
brands.35 For all these reasons, we expect it to be particularly important to
control for this heterogeneity or chain-specific effects in our analyses.
Since the unobserved chain effects are expected to be correlatedwith other
chain characteristics, including age, size, and contracting practices, we
cannot treat them as random effects in our estimations. Hausman tests
comparing results from linear fixed and random-effects models always
rejected the random effects specification, confirming our expectations that
the chain unobserved heterogeneity in our data is correlated with the
regressors. To correct for such correlated unobserved chain heterogeneity
(or chain ‘fixed effects’) in Tobit, we follow the methodology suggested in
Wooldridge [1995, 2002 ch.16) and Mundlak [1978].36 Specifically, we
assume that chain unobserved heterogeneity (mi) can be modelled as
mi ¼ Xixþ ai, where Xi is the vector of the chain-level means of all chain
time-varying characteristics (Xit, t5 1,..Ti) included as a set of additional
controls in the standard Tobit model, and ai represents the part of chain
unobserved heterogeneity that is assumed uncorrelatedwith the regressors.37
Since Tobit estimates are inconsistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity
– a problem that is likely to arise due to the non-linear impact of age and size
on growth rates (e.g., Evans [1987a]) – we include quadratic terms in chain
age, size and their cross effect in our regressions. As noted earlier, we also
exclude outliers with growth rates 4 500%.38
Table II, columns 1 and 2, show results from (chain fixed-effects adjusted)
Tobit and standard linear fixed-effects model for Franchising Growth (top
panel), and Total Growth (bottom panel). As mentioned above, all
regressions include survey year dummy variables. In addition, Tobit
specifications include sector, headquarter state and Canadian dummy
variables (all of which are differenced out in linear fixed-effects models).
35 For more on multi-chain ownership, see Kosová, Lafontaine and Zhao [2009].
36Mundlak [1978] shows that the results from standard linear fixed-effects models can be
obtained via random effects estimations when firm-level means of time-varying regressors are
added as additional controls. Wooldridge [1995, 2002 ch.16] recommends using this idea in
non-linear models (probit/tobit) as it is impossible to difference out fixed effects in these as is
done in standard linear fixed-effects model. This approach by definition excludes means of
time-invariant chain characteristics (i.e., business experience or location of headquarters or
Canadian dummy variable, as well as sector dummy variables), but also means of aggregate
dummy variables such as survey year.
37We also estimated Random Effects Tobit models to allow for uncorrelated chain-level
unobserved heterogeneity (ai) in the error term, but the results were very similar to those
we report for pooled Tobit.
38 Before outliers were excluded, robust standard errors from linear fixed-effectsmodels were
different from their non-corrected counterparts, suggesting that heteroscedasticity was a
problem in our data. After the outliers were excluded, the standard errors between these two
specifications were similar. Hence, excluding the outliers reliably addressed the heteroscedas-
ticity problem that would otherwise have biased the tobit estimations.
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Table II




Effects Model Weibulla Coxa
Franchising Growth (FGrowth) Exit from Franchising (FExit)
Ageb  11.58  9.00
(0.38) (0.31)
Age Squared 0.17 0.16
(0.01) (0.01)
Sizeb (10)  0.08  0.10 1.04 1.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Size Squared (100) 0.00003 0.00005 0.99998 0.9996
(0.00003) (0.00003) (5.7E-06) (0.00002)
Age * Size (10)  0.00002  0.00001
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 15404 15404 15404 15404
# of Chains 3870 3870 3870 3870
# of Exits 1409 1409 1409 1409
R2 0.01 0.10
Log-likelihood  81061  2531  9249
sigma_e (Tobit)/ 77.31  0.14
ln( p) (Weibull) (0.44) (0.03)
Total Growth (TGrowth) Exit from Business (TExit)
Ageb  5.67  4.90
(0.27) (0.23)
Age Squared 0.06 0.06
(0.005) (0.004)
Sizeb (10)  0.21  0.21 1.03 1.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Size Squared (100) 0.00001 0.00001 0.9999 0.9998
(0.00001) (0.00001) (4.9E-06) (5.2E-06)
Age * Size (10) 0.004
 0.004
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 14445 14445 14445 14445
# of Chains 3421 3421 3421 3421
# of Exits 341 341 341 341
R2 0.01 0.08
Log-likelihood  75999  829  1956
sigma_e (Tobit)/ 51.10  0.67
ln( p) (Weibull) (0.07) (0.08)
aWe control for chain-level unobserved correlated heterogeneity per Wooldridge [1995, 2002].
bAge (size) refers to years since the chain began franchising (number of franchisedoutlets) in the upper panel and
to the number of years since the chain started operating (total number of outlets) in the bottom panel.
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at: 10%; 5%; 1%. In columns 3–4 exponentiated coefficients
and robust standard errors calculated by the Delta method (adjusted for heteroscedasticity and chain-level
clusters) reported. In these columns the levels of significance are assessed based on original coefficients and
standard errors (see text). All regressions contain survey year dummy variables. In addition, Tobit and exit
specifications include sector, franchisor headquarter state and Canadian dummy variables. In Linear Fixed
Effects regressions, these are differenced out.
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Results in Table II are quite consistent in terms of sign and significance
levels for both measures of growth, and the different corresponding
definitions of chain age and size. As predicted by Jovanovic-type learning
models and evidenced in the literature on manufacturing firms, chain age
and size have sizable, and statistically significant, negative effects on growth.
In particular, the negative linear effects of age and size dominate the
opposite sign quadratic effects: holding all variables at theirmean values, the
net effect of increasing chain age (years in business) by a single year in
column 2 of Table II in the bottom panel is to reduce the growth rate
(TGrowth) by 2.7 percentage points. Increasing total chain size by 10
outlets, on the other hand, reduces the growth rate in the net by 0.14
percentage points.39 These are economically important effects given a mean
‘total’ growth rate of 14.52 per cent (Table I). Most importantly, we find
these effects even after controlling for unobserved chain heterogeneity.
Finding anegative impact of chain size on growthwhile controlling for chain
fixed effects suggests that there is convergence in our data to chain-specific
sizes.40 We come back to this issue later, when we discuss results for the
subsample of mature chains.
IV(iii). Chain Exit
Given that Figure 3 suggests negative duration dependence, we rely on a
Weibull specification for our exit analyses, which allows us to test for
such dependence. As a robustness check, we also report results from a
Cox model, which has the advantage that it does not rely on distribu-
tional assumptions.41
In a Weibull model, survival time S (let’s denote its particular value s),
measured by age, follows the distribution f ðsÞ ¼ p  sp1eðXbspeXbÞ, where
f denotes the extreme value density function, X is the vector of regressors
(with subscripts i for chain and t for year omitted for simplicity) and p
represents the duration parameter in the baseline hazard. If po 1 (or
ln(p)o 0), we have negative duration dependence, meaning that older
chains have lower exit rates, whereas p5 1 or p4 1 indicate no or positive
duration dependence, respectively. The Weibull model exhibits the
‘proportional hazard rate’ property, i.e., its hazard function, which is the
rate at which a chain exits given it has survived until time s, can be written as
39The net effect of Age (Years in Business) on Total Growth is (@TGrowth/
@Age)5 [bAgeþ 2bsq.Age mean(Age)þ bAgeSize mean(Size)], where sample mean(Size)5 21.9
measured in 10’s, and mean(Age)5 17.6, per Table I.
40 See Geroski et al. [2003] for more discussion, especially on the difference between firm-
specific and overall convergence in firm size. Our results support the former, not the latter.
41One drawback of the Cox model for our purposes is that it does not allow us to test for
negative duration dependence, as predicted by Jovanovic’s [1982] model. Also, if the Weibull
distribution fits the data well, the estimates from the Weibull will be more efficient.
SURVIVAL ANDGROWTH IN RETAIL AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES 561
r 2010 The Authors.
The Journalof IndustrialEconomicsr2010Blackwell PublishingLtd. and theEditorialBoardof TheJournalof IndustrialEconomics.
hðsÞ ¼ h0ðsÞeXb. Thus changes in regressors shift the baseline hazard,
h0(s), and the exponentiated coefficients capture the effect of a one unit
increase in a particular variable on the exit hazard ratio.42 The Cox
proportional hazard model (Cox [1972]) also satisfies this property.43
Given this, to facilitate interpretation, we report exponentiated coefficients
in the tables below. If the reported coefficient (b) is greater than one,
the difference (b 1)100 indicates a percentage by which a given variable
increases the exit rate. Similarly, if bo 1, the difference (1 b)100
represents the percentage reduction in the exit rate that would result
from a one unit increase in the variable. The reported standard errors are
calculated by the Delta method and adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
chain-level clusters.44 As is standard in survival analyses, due to the skewed
distribution of the exponentiated coefficients, the levels of significance –
indicated by stars in the table – are assessed based on original coefficients
and standard errors.
Two data issues affect our exit estimations. In our sample there are 1,409
exits from franchising (FExit) and 341 total exits (TExit). Since we know
when the chains started in business and began franchising, we have complete
duration spells for the chains that we see exiting during our sample period.
For non-exiting chains, however, duration spells are incomplete and
observations are right censored. In addition, there are chains that operated
for several years before entering our sample. But a chain can enter our
sample for example at age5 6 only if it has survived this long. The presence
of such chains in the data could introduce survivorship bias in our
estimations. We control for survivorship bias (or left truncation) by
conditioning the maximum-likelihood function on the age at which a chain
enters our sample, and for data censoring by conditioning on whether an
observation is right censored or not.
Results from both the Weibull and Cox models are shown in Table II, in
columns 3 and 4 respectively, and again focusing on franchising only (FExit)
in the top, and total business (TExit) in the bottom panel of the table. All
regressions again include sector, state of franchisor headquarter, Canadian
and year dummy variables. Also, since the growth results indicated the
presence of chain-level unobserved correlated heterogeneity, we correct for
42 Suppose that we have only one covariate, X, that we increase by 1 unit. The ratio of exit






43We use Efron’s approximation to handle tied exits in the Cox model – see Hosmer and
Lemeshow [1999, p. 107] for the partial likelihood function adjusted for this approximation.
44 Besides controlling for chain correlated unobserved heterogeneity (chain fixed effects) we
also allow for random effects (‘uncorrelated’ heterogeneity) in the error terms and adjust the
standard errors for chain-level clusters.
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this in our exit regressions using the methodology suggested byWooldridge
[1995, 2002 ch.16] (see Section IV(ii)).
Consistent with our growth rate results, we find that both chain age (per
the coefficient ln( p) in the Weibull model) and size matter even when we
control for chain-specific effects. Since firm age and size affect survival rates
and growth because they capture the intrinsic ‘efficiency’ of the firm
learning-based models, and we control for such efficiency via the chain-
specific effects, we can conclude that firm unobserved efficiency and the
associated learning process are not the only mechanism through which age
and size affect chain dynamics. Also, the coefficients on squared terms are of
opposite signs, but the linear effects always dwarf the non-linear ones. Thus,
consistent with theory and previous empirical studies, we conclude that
chain age has a negative effect on exit. However, chain size has a positive
rather than negative effect on exit. In other words, within chains, growing
larger increases the likelihoodof failure, a finding that contradicts Jovanovic
[1982] learning-type models, as well as current stylized facts in the empirical
literature. In the next section, we explore whether, as suggested by e.g.,
Klepper and Thompson [2006], our results may be due to other factors that
would be correlated with age and size, but are omitted from our simple
regressions above.
IV(iv). Controlling for Observed Chain Characteristics
Unlike most other studies on firm dynamics, our data have the advantage of
including detailed characteristics for each chain. It is of interest to consider
how the introduction of these chain characteristics – beyond industry sector
and state of headquarter – not only affect the results above, but also directly
affect chain growth or survival. Of course, it is also important to recognize
that control variables such as the proportion of company outlets and the
terms of the franchise contracts reflect decisions made by company
managers. Following the sequence of events in Jovanovic’s [1982] and
similar learning-based models, contracting practices measured at time t are
predetermined at the beginning of period tþ 1 when the chain chooses its
output (growth) or makes its exit decision. In that sense, the regression
coefficients for these control variables are consistent. Still, one might be
concerned that the observed correlations between contracting variables and,
say, survival might be due to unobserved factors that affect both contract
terms and chain survival. For example, high quality franchisors may choose
high fees (franchise fees and royalty rates) or require high levels of
investments, and at the same time these high-quality chains will tend to
survive longer and grow faster. If we do not control for chain quality, the
coefficients of the feesmight be biased downward (e.g., without fixed effects,
higher franchised fees would reduce, not increase, FExit). Assuming that
chain quality is constant over time, which is likely given that it represents the
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appeal of the chain’s concept or product, or that the probability that a new
product concept is not just a fad is constant over time, then controlling for
chain unobserved correlated heterogeneity (or chain ‘fixed effects’) as was
done above alleviates this concern.
We show results obtained after adding contracting practices andour other
chain characteristics to our growth regressions in Table III, and for our exit
regressions in Table IV, columns 1–4.
These results show that controlling for other chain characteristics affects
the magnitudes of our estimates in Table II, especially the impact of age on
FGrowth and FExit. Without the control variables (Table II) the chains
show stronger negative duration dependence (per the ln(p) coefficients in the
exit regressions). Also, one more year of franchising has a greater negative
impact on the franchising growth rate (5.5 vs. 4.4 percentage points, at the
mean of 10.3%) per the linear fixed-effects growth equation results.
However, the inclusion of the control variables does not change our
qualitative findings – the effects of age and size remain statistically
significant, economically important, and of the same signs as in Table II.
In particular, chain size continues to have a significant negative impact on
growth – which confirms the convergence in size toward chain-specific sizes
– and a positive effect on exit.
As for the effects of the contracting practices and chain characteristics
themselves, in the growth regressions (Table III) we find first that the
number of years that the franchisor spends developing the franchise concept
before starting to franchise (Business Experience) has a strong positive effect
on franchising growth, as expected.45 Larger proportions of company
outlets in the chain are also positively related to growth, and this effect is
particularly strong for franchising (as opposed to total) growth. This result
contradicts the notion from the franchising literature that franchising allows
chains to grow faster. It is consistent, however, with findings in Lafontaine
and Shaw [2005] as it indicates that franchisors whose proportion of
company outlets is ‘unusually’ high at a point in time tend to grow the
franchised side of their businesses,most likely to get back to their target level
of company ownership.46 The total growth in the chain then represents
45 This variable does not appear in columns 3 and 4 because the time spent developing the
franchise is included in the Age variable (i.e., Age5Bus. Experienceþ years of franchising)
in these columns. Moreover, its effect is subsumed in the chain-specific effects in the Fixed-
Effects regression in column 2.
46 For example, Accor North America – one of the largest hotel companies in the world –
recently announced the opening of 57 new hotels in North America, including 51 franchised
and 6 company owned properties. According to Olivier Poirot, the CEO: ‘Our growth plans in
North America are consistent with Accor’s philosophy to maintain balance as an owner/
operator, management partner and franchisor . . . By increasing the growth of both franchised
and corporately-owned locations in our network, Accor is getting closer to achieving our goal
of reaching 1,200NorthAmerican properties by 2010’ [HNNHotelnewsnow.com, January 20,
2009, emphasis added].
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mostly the effect that the increased number of franchised outlets has on total
chain size. Though these effects are not always statistically significant, we
also find that higher capital requirements and franchise fees have a negative,
while sales-based fees have a positive, effect on chain growth rates. These
Table III
Chain%Growth -TobitandLinear FixedEffectsModel
(All specifications control forchain unobservedcorrelatedheterogeneity)






Ageb  9.48  7.26  5.10  4.42
(0.38) (0.30) (0.27) (0.23)
Age Squared 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.004)
Sizeb (10)  0.07  0.09  0.21  0.21
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Size Squared (100) 0.00002 0.00004 0.00002 0.00002
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Age * Size (10) 0.0004 0.0004 0.004
 0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bus. Experience 0.11
(0.05)
Percent Co-own 1.74 1.72 0.56 0.56
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital Required  0.27  0.35  0.09  0.12
(0.28) (0.22) (0.20) (0.17)
Franchise Fee  17.43  15.14  18.00  16.72
(10.22) (8.00) (7.75) (6.43)
Advertising Fee 0.13 0.21 0.57 0.59
(0.76) (0.59) (0.56) (0.46)
Royalty Rate 0.86 0.84 0.37 0.38
(0.59) (0.46) (0.45) (0.37)
Ongoing Fixed Fee 8.65 8.13 7.05 6.65
(5.06) (3.93) (3.79) (3.14)
Canadian  28.97  25.63
(32.12) (23.53)
Constant 9.75 36.77 33.26 60.17
(33.07) (4.18) (24.22) (3.98)
Observations 15404 15404 14445 14445
# of Chains 3870 3870 3421 3421
# of Exits 1409 1409 341 341
R2 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.09
Log-likelihood  80683  75888
sigma_e 69.41 50.72
(0.43) (0.30)
aWe control for chain-level unobserved correlated heterogeneity (i.e., chain fixed effects) as discussed in
Wooldridge [1995, 2002] – see Sections IV(ii)-IV(iii).
bAge (Size) refers to years since the chain began franchising (number of franchised outlets) in columns 1–2, but
to the number of years since the chain started operating (total number of outlets) in columns 3–4.
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at: 10%; 5%; 1%. All regressions contain survey year dummy
variables. In addition, Tobit specifications include sector and franchisor headquarter state dummies. In Linear
Fixed-Effects regressions, these are differenced out.
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results suggest that ongoing revenue streams for franchisors, via royalties or
other such fees, and low upfront requirements for franchisees, are most
conducive to franchise chain growth.
In our exit regressions, in Table IV columns 1–4, we find results for
the control variables that are largely consistent with those we found for
growth. In particular, the extent to which the chain took time to develop
its business prior to franchising (Business Experience) and the extent to
which it operates outlets corporately (Percent Co-Own) are both positively
related to the likelihood that it remains in franchising. The effects are
quite small, however, with a 1–2% decrease in exit rate for each extra
year of business experience or percentage point increase in company
ownership.47 Higher amounts of capital required to open each outlet in a
chain, and higher franchise fees, increase the likelihood of exit, suggesting
that it ismore difficult for franchisors to find franchiseeswhen the amount of
capital required – and/or franchise fee – is relatively high. This lack of
success in finding franchisees then increases the likelihood that the
franchisor stops franchising and either continues to operate as a corporate
chain, or goes out of business. Finally, though these effects are not always
statistically significant, higher variable fees (royalty rates and advertising
fees) tend to reduce the likelihood of chain exit from franchising. Thus,
greater ongoing revenue streams for franchisors again increase the
likelihood that the chain remains in franchising.
Overall, the results we obtain when including control variables point to
important interactions among contracting practices and chain characteristics,
and a clear direct impact of these variables on both growth and exit rates.
However, the inclusion of these variables does not explain away any of our
findings so far, including the anomalous positive impact of chain size on exit.
Since previous studies – traditionally focused on manufacturing data –
usually did not control for firm/establishment fixed effects, in columns 5–8 of
Table IV,we explorewhether our anomalous exit resultmight be driven by the
inclusion of chain-level ‘fixed effects.’We confirm that indeed, whenwe do not
control for these, chain sizehas anegative impact on exit in all specifications, as
in the prior literature. We conclude that our anomalous result for chain size is
not due to the specifics of our retail-chain setting, but to the lack of firm fixed-
effects in the prior empirical literature. Indeed, if firm size were positively
correlated with unobserved firm heterogeneity such as quality of the firm, or
the timing of entry within the ‘industry life cycle’ perAgarwal andGort [1996,
2002], the coefficients on size in exit regressions that do not control for chain
fixed effects would be biased downward. Our findings suggest that the results
reported in prior studies may well be biased in this way.
47 Since ourmeasure of total exit implies that the proportionof companyoutlets equals 0, any
positive value determines survival perfectly sowe cannot include this variable in our analyses of
Total Exit (TExit) inTable IV. Similarly, business experience is part of age in analyses of TExit.
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IV(v). Robustness Checks
Althoughwe do not report these, we performed several analyses to verify the
robustness of our results. In addition to estimating our empirical models
using different approaches and specifications, as described above, we also
examined how our results might differ across industry sectors in our data.48
Indeed, although all our estimations control for chain correlated unobserved
heterogeneity (i.e., chain specific effects), and all non-linear specifications
(i.e., those that do not rely on data de-meaning) include sectoral dummy
variables – all of which should reliably capture systematic differences across
the 23 sectors in our data – it might still be that our results are not general,
but instead are driven by data patterns peculiar to just a few sectors. Our
within-sector results for the growth equation, however, were consistent
across sectors, and with those we report.49 Moreover, to make sure our
results were not driven by the few sectors with greater numbers of chains in
ourdata,we estimated all ourmodels for a subsample that excluded the three
sectorswithmore than 400 chains (namelyBusiness Services, Fast-Food and
Retail – Other – see Table AI in the appendix). Again, results for this
subsample were very consistent with those we report. We conclude that our
results are not driven by just a few sectors, but instead are consistent across
the broad set of business activities that franchisors engage in.
Finally,weverified thatour resultswerenotdrivenbyoutlyingobservations.
Sincewealready excludeoutliers in termsof growth fromourdata (see thedata
section), we focused here on outliers defined in terms of chain size and age.We
found that resultswereunaffectedwhenweexcludedobservations fromthe top
and bottom 5% of the franchised chain size distribution. However, excluding
observations based on age had a substantial effect on our results. In particular,
excluding young chains from our analyses affects results in important ways.
Since analyses of mature chains are of interest for several reasons also from a
theoretical perspective, we discuss these in detail below.
IV(vi). Mature Chains
Our longpanel data set allows us to explore how resultsmight differwhenwe
focus on established franchised chains only. This is of interest because
Jovanovic’s [1982] learning model implies that the impact of firm age and
size on firm dynamics should diminish with age, as mature firms have
relatively precise expectations about their efficiency and no longer learn (or
update) their type based much on market outcomes. Evans [1987a, b] also
finds different data patterns for mature firms. Subsample analyses for
48 These results are available upon request.
49 Smaller sectors were excluded from these analyses due to small sample sizes. In addition,
due to the small number of exits per sector we could not reliably estimate exit equations within
sectors.
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mature chains are of interest also because in the franchising literature,
Lafontaine and Shaw [2005] have shown that it takes about seven to eight
years for franchised chains to achieve a stable mix of company and
franchised outlets, one that they tend to maintain from that point on. Thus
franchisors’ business practices are expected to bemore stable amongmature
chains. Finally, Pakes and Ericson [1998] find that by age 8, unlike in
manufacturing, the size distribution of firms in the retail sector is very close
to its limit size distribution, suggesting again that retail firms of this age and
above have achieved some degree of stability in the way they do business.
Table V reproduces the growth regressions in Table III for the subsample
of franchised chains with at least 8 years of franchising experience. We find
TableV
Growth ^ TobitandLinear FixedEffects ^ Years inFranchising 4 7
(All specifications control forchain unobservedcorrelatedheterogeneity)






Ageb  2.77  2.01  1.41  1.09
(0.27) (0.22) (0.19) (0.16)
Age Squared 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Sizeb (10)  0.11  0.11  0.13  0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Size Squared (100) 0.00003 0.00003 0.00002 0.00002
(0.00002) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Age * Size (10) 0.001 0.001
 0.0014 0.0014
(0.001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Bus. Experience 0.05
(0.03)
Percent Co-own 0.60 0.61  0.01  0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Capital Required  0.01  0.03  0.001  0.01
(0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08)
Franchise Fee 0.85 0.95  0.94  0.97
(6.27) (5.09) (4.91) (3.97)
Advertising Fee 0.46 0.55 0.54 0.55
(0.46) (0.37) (0.36) (0.29)
Royalty Rate 0.58 0.59 0.45 0.46
(0.40) (0.33) (0.32) (0.26)
Ongoing Fixed Fee 0.28 0.43 2.30 2.26
(3.00) (2.42) (2.42) (1.95)
Canadian  7.13  14.31
(31.71) (24.72)
Constant  5.10 20.17 16.3 24.42
(32.07) (3.44) (24.98) (3.09)
Observations 7998 7998 7794 7794
# of Chains 1640 1640 1560 1560
# of Exits 272 272 64 64
R2 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05
Log-likelihood  37958  35728
sigma_e 31.08 24.22
(0.25) (0.20)
Notes: See Table III.
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that chain age and size still have a negative effect on chain growth in this
subsample. However, except for the effect of chain size in the franchising
growth equation (FGrowth), the magnitude of the effects is much smaller
than in the overall sample (Table III). Still, we find strong evidence of
convergence in size among mature chains, just as in our overall sample.
Though not shown in the tables, we further analyzed the effect of age, size
and other chain characteristics on growth using several other subsamples of
mature franchised chains. We found that the age effect on chain growth,
however defined, disappears only when the chains have been franchising or
in business for 30 years or more. The negative effect of size on growth,
moreover, remained even for the subsample of chains with more than 30
years in franchising. Evans [1987a, b] found similar results.
We conclude that chains converge in size to some chain-specific levels. In
otherwords, chain size is bounded, contrary to the implications of Jovanovic
and Rob [1987] and results obtained by Geroski et al. [2003]. However,
Geroski et al.’s sample of very large and long-lastingmanufacturing firms in
Britain consists of mostly multi-product firms, rather than the single-
product entities emphasized in the theory. In this vein, Dunne et al. [1989]
find that firm growth falls with size and age only among single-plant firms,
while among multi-plant firms the opposite is true. Assuming that multi-
plant firms are more likely to also be multi-product, their results are
consistent with ours and Geroski’s. And indeed models that consider the
multi-product nature of firms yield different predictions, implying in
particular that such firms may or may not be bounded in size (to our
knowledge only themodels byKlepper and Thompson [2006] and byNocke
and Yeaple [2006] clearly imply limits to ‘overall’ firm size). We believe that
our result that individual chains converge in size arises clearly in our data
exactly because of the single-product nature of franchised chains. We
conclude that at the intensive margin – i.e., how much of a single product a
firm produces – there are indeed limits to size and growth.
In Table VI, we show results for exit from franchising (FExit) for the
sample of established franchised chains.Unfortunately, the small number of
total chain exits does not allow us to reproduce the TExit analyses for
mature chains. Also, we must replace the headquarters state dummy
variables by a single regulation state dummy variable as we do not have a
sufficient number of exits to use the full set of headquarters state variables.
Controlling for chain fixed effects, the results show that neither size nor age
(ln( p) is insignificant) have a significant impact on exit rates. This does not
mean that large (older) chains do not exit, but rather that ceteris paribus, the
probability of exit is unrelated to their size (age).
These findings are consistent with Jovanovic [1982] and similar learning-
type models of industry dynamics. The reduced role of early learning
processes for mature chains is further supported by the insignificance of the
Business Experience variable inTablesV andVI (compare toTables III, IV).
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We also find that the proportion of company owned outlets no longer has
an effect on exit rates, supporting the earlier arguments that mature chains
had already found the right balance between the numbers of franchised and
companyowned outlets. Contract terms, on the other hand, continue to play
a role similar to that found in our overall sample. The effects are even
starker, with franchise fees and capital required increasing the likelihood
that chains exit franchising, but having no significant effect on their growth,
while higher royalty rates and advertising fees have a significant positive
effect on the growth rates of mature chains. Thus a strong financial position
TableVI
Exit fromFranchising,FWeibull andCoxFYears inFranchising4 7
(All specifications control forchain unobservedcorrelatedheterogeneity)
FExit: Exit from Franchising
Weibulla Coxa
Sizeb (10) 0.98 0.98
(0.02) (0.02)
Size Squared (100) 1.00 1.00
(7.8E-06) (7.7E-06)
Bus. Experience 0.99 0.99
(0.01) (0.01)
Percent Co-own 1.00 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Capital Required 1.12 1.14
(0.04) (0.04)
Franchise Fee 6.97 8.98
(6.15) (8.42)
Advertising Fee 0.98 0.98
(0.06) (0.06)
Royalty Rate 0.97 0.96
(0.04) (0.04)




Regulation State 1.15 1.16
(0.16) (0.16)
Observations 7998 7998
# of Chains 1640 1640
# of Exits 272 272
ln( p)  0.07
(0.15)
Log-likelihood  416  1545
aWe control for chain-level unobserved correlated heterogeneity (i.e. chain fixed effects) as discussed in
Wooldridge [1995, 2002] – see Sections IV(ii)-IV(iii).
bSize refers to franchised outlets.
Exponentiated coefficients reported. Robust standard errors calculated by the Delta method and adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and chain-level clusters, in parentheses. Levels of significance assessed based on original
coefficients and standard errors (see text). Significant at: 10%; 5%; 1%.All regressions contain sector and
survey year dummy variables.
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for the franchisor, generated fromongoing fees basedonoutlets’ sales, seems
to ensure the growth of more mature chains.
The results above also imply that the strong positive effect of size on chain
exit in Table IV must be driven by the young chains in our data, which, as
mentioned in Section III(ii), represent more than 50% of our sample. In
other words, it is young chains that have a tendency tomake ‘mistakes,’ or to
rely on over-optimistic assessments regarding their likelihood of success in
the market, and grow too big early on. These chains then find that they have
overstretched their resources or that the demand for their product is not as
high as they anticipated, with the ultimate result being that they exit
franchising or fail.50
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have examined whether the age and size of franchised retail
and service chains have the same effect on chain survival and growth as has
been found in the empirical literature to date, most of which has focused on
manufacturing firms/plants. We have also analyzed how contracting terms
and chain characteristics may affect chains’ survival and growth, and
whether the stylized facts concerning age and size effects might be driven by
such characteristics, as suggested, e.g., by Klepper and Thompson [2006].
We found a negative impact of age and size on chain growth, and a
positive impact of age on chain survival, as in the previous literature, even
after controlling for chain unobserved correlated heterogeneity (or chain
fixed effects). Thus firms’ learning process about their ‘unobserved
efficiency’ or ‘type’ – as posited by Jovanovic-type models – is not the only
reason for age and size to affect firm growth or exit. Moreover, the
robustness of these results to whether or not we include the contract
variables and other chain characteristics implies that these other variables
also are not driving the age and size effects.
In addition, we found that controlling for chain fixed effects is crucial in
these analyses, as it reverses the impact of size on chain survival. Specifically,
being larger increases the likelihood of chain exit rather than decreasing it.
For mature chains, however, we find no evidence that age or size affects exit
rates. We conclude that young chains make ‘mistakes’ – or over-optimistic
assessments about their odds of success in the market by overestimating
demand or their resources – and subsequently, after a few periods of high
growth, find that their ‘efficiency/type’ was not that high, and exit. We
believe that the positive effect of size on exitmay showupmore clearly in our
data on franchised chains because business concepts in the types of
industries where one finds franchising often can be copied fairly easily. Yet
50According to InfoPress [1988] franchisors often project unrealistically high growth rates in
their first few years.
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the trade press suggests that franchisors attributemuch value to their brand/
franchise concepts. Moreover, given the contractual relationship upon
which franchising relies, franchisees, not the franchisor, bear most of the
cost of outlet failures.51 Thus, if the product concept or outlets turns out to
be unsuccessful, instead of downsizing/shrinking – as Jovanovic-type
models would predict, and as implied by the ‘shadow of death effect’
observed in manufacturing, e.g., Griliches and Regev [1995] – franchisors
can exit while being relatively large, as the recent example of Bennigan’s
documents.52 Similar issues of overconfidence, and principal-agent pro-
blems between creditors and equity holders, or between managers and
shareholders, have been documented in the finance and entrepreneurship
literature, e.g., Ritter [1991] or Goel and Thakor [2008], but have not been
explored in the literature on industry and firm dynamics.
Our results also provide strong evidence that chains converge in size
towards chain-specific sizes. Rather than being the consequence of the type
of cost efficiency parameter emphasized in models such as Jovanovic’s,
however, in the type of industries where franchising occurs, the limit more
likely arises from consumers’ tastes for product diversity. In other words,
some chains, like McDonald’s and Subway, can grow very large but, in the
end, customers still value having different alternative products available to
them. Large franchising firms can address this desire for variety by
establishing several franchised chains offering different types of product.
Some franchising companies have pursued growth in this way, including, for
example, Yum! Brands, owner of Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, KFC and others. In
our data, however, these different chains appear as separate entities whose
size, per our results, is again bounded.
Results in Geroski et al. [2003] and other studies of large manufacturing
firms (see Sutton [1997], Caves [1998] and Audretsch et al. [2004] for
surveys), in contrast, suggest an absence of size-convergence inmanufactur-
ing. But large manufacturing firms are likely to be highly diversified – or
multi-product – entities that have introduced and abandoned numerous
products over the years. Mitchell [2000], Klepper and Thompson [2006],
Bernard, Redding and Schott [2006, 2010] and Nocke and Yeaple [2006]
have all proposedmodels of firm dynamics where firms engage in more than
51For example, in the hotel industry The Economist [2009] notes: ‘However, the brunt of
recession will be borne by the hotels’ owners [franchisees] rather than chains that manage and
franchise them. Simon Mezzanotte of Société Générale, a bank, explains that if RevPar
(revenue per available room) falls 1% at a hotel, its owner [franchisee] typically suffers a 5%
profits fall.’ But the management and franchise fees [collected by franchisors] fall only by 3%
and 1% respectively. ‘[Thus] many hotel owners [franchisees], having taken most of the risk,
will collapse into bankruptcy during the recession.’
52 Business Week. ‘After a Franchisor Files for Bankruptcy’. August 4, 2008. Hotel
franchisors use similar practices – if a property/franchisee no longer delivers on the brand
promise or may in fact hurt the overall image, the hotel can be converted into an independent
property without franchisor’s support (HNN Hotelnewsnow.com [Feb. 5, 2009]).
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one activity. While these models imply a limit to firm scope (i.e., the number
of different products they offer), this literature has not fully explored
differences in intensive (howmuchof each product is produced) vs. extensive
(howmany products are offered) margins for firm growth.We leave the very
interesting question of how firm scope and experience with various products
might affect chain and firm size and growth for future work. Our analyses
and results on the effect of product-level experience – age and size – on
product-level growth and survival, however, show that there are indeed
limits to size on the intensivemargin. In that sense, our results underscore the
importance of recognizing the existence of these different margins for firm
growth in empirical work on firm dynamics.
More generally,we viewour results as highlighting the need for theoretical
models, as well as future empirical work, on firm and industry dynamics to
better account for organizational and institutional features of industry. In
our setting, for example, contracting practices clearly matter for both
growth and exit, and that even for mature chains. Similarly, incorporating
into the theory the possibility of different ownership structures, and the
related capacity of firms to have others – here franchisees – bear much of the
exit costs, could help explain cross-industry differences in entry and exit
rates. Finally, from apublic policy perspective, our findings also imply a role
for education, in this case of franchisees, as to the potential risks of failure,
and how such risks may be affected by a chain’s reliance on franchising.
APPENDIX
Our data set is an unbalanced panel. Table AI lists the 23 sectors in which these firms
operate, and descriptive statistics for each sector.
Sample Definition
From an original 22,299 observations, we excluded 83 because they reported a royalty
rate above 30%, leading us to believe that these were not royalties based on sales. This
gave us our sample of 22,216 observations across 5,044 chains. We then lost 6,681
observations for FGrowth and 7,712 for TGrowth because either the growth rate was
missing (we did not have subsequent data to calculate the growth rate), or we were
missing data for various regressors in different years. Note that we ignore single year
gaps in our data, calculating growth as ((outlets at time tþ 2) – (outlets at time t))/
outlets at time t in these cases.Almost all these gaps arise because of themissing data for
1999. Also, there are observations where we have zero franchised outlets at time t,
which presents a problem in calculating franchising (FGrowth). (This is not an issue for
total growth (TGrowth) since there is always at least one outlet, franchised or not, in a
chain in our data). If there were still no franchised outlets the next year and the
franchisor did not officially exit, we set FGrowth equal to zero in these cases. If a
franchisor did officially exit we set FGrowth equal to  100%. If there were franchised
outlets the next year, to avoid infinite growth rates, we replaced franchised outlets at
time t by 1 and calculated the growth rates as usual.
574 RENÁTA KOSOVÁ AND FRANCINE LAFONTAINE
r 2010 The Authors.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SURVIVAL ANDGROWTH IN RETAIL AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES 575
r 2010 The Authors.
The Journalof IndustrialEconomicsr2010Blackwell PublishingLtd. and theEditorialBoardof TheJournalof IndustrialEconomics.
REFERENCES
Agarwal, R. andGort,M., 1996, ‘The Evolution ofMarkets andEntry, Exit and Survival
of Firms,’ The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, pp. 489–498.
Agarwal, R. and Gort, M., 2002, ‘Firm and Product Life Cycles and Firm Survival,’
The American Economic Review, 92, pp. 184–190.
Audretsch, D. B.; Klomp, L.; Santarelli, E. and Thurik, A. R., 2004, ‘Gibrat’s Law: Are
the Services Different?,’ Review of Industrial Organization, 24, pp. 301–324.
Azoulay, P. and Shane, S., 2001, ‘Entrepreneurs, Contracts and the Failure of Young
Firms,’Management Science, 47, pp. 337–358.
Basker, E. and Pham, H. V., 2007, ‘Wal-Mart as Catalyst to U.S.-China Trade,’
University of Missouri working paper, Columbia, Missouri, U.S.A.
Bernard, A. B.; Redding, S. J. and Schott, P.K., 2006, ‘Multi-Product Firms and Product
Switching’, NBER working paper no. 12293, (NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
U.S.A.).
Bernard, A. B.; Redding, S. J. and Schott, P. K., 2010, ‘Multiple-Product Firms and
Product Switching,’ The American Economic Review, 100, pp. 629–685.
Blair, R. D. and Lafontaine, F., 2005, The Economics of Franchising (Cambridge
University Press, New York, U.S.A.).
Bloom, N.; Sadun, R. and Van Reenen, J., 2007, ‘Americans do IT Better: U.S.
Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle,’ CEP discussion paper no.788, London
School of Economics, London, England.
Bond, R., Various years, Bond’s Franchise Guide (Source Book Publications, Oakland,
California, U.S.A.).
Bond, R., Various Years, The Source Book of Franchise Opportunities (Richard D. Irwin
Publishing, Burr Ridge, Illinois, U.S.A.).
Bradach, J. L., 1998, Franchise Organizations (Harvard Business School Press, Boston,
Massachusetts, U.S.A.).
Bureau of Labor Statistics, ‘Summary Table B., Employment, Hours, and Earnings of
Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls, Seasonally Adjusted (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/
empsit.cessum.txt)
Business Week, 2008 (August 4), ‘After a Franchisor Files for Bankruptcy.’
Cabral, L. M. B. and Mata, J., 2003, ‘On the Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution:
Facts and Theory,’ The American Economic Review, 93, pp. 1075–1090.
Caves, R. E., 1998, ‘Industrial Organization and New Findings on the Turnover and
Mobility of Firms,’ Journal of Economic Literature, 36, pp. 1947–1982.
Clementi, G. L. and Hopenhayn, H. A., 2006, ‘A Theory of Financing Constraints and
Firm Dynamics,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, pp. 229–265.
Cooley, T. F. and Quadrini, V., 2001, ‘Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics,’
The American Economic Review, 91, pp. 1286–1310.
Cox,D.R., 1972, ‘RegressionModels andLife Tables’ (with discussion), Journal ofRoyal
Statistical Society, Series B (34), pp. 187–220.
Disney, R.; Haskel, J. and Heden, Y., 2003, ‘Entry, Exit and Establishment Survival in
U.K. Manufacturing,’ Journal of Industrial Economics, 51, pp. 91–112.
Dunne, T.; Roberts, M. J. and Samuelson, L., 1988, ‘Patterns of Firm Entry
and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries,’ RAND Journal of Economics, 19, pp.
495–515.
Dunne, T.; Roberts, M. J. and Samuelson, L., 1989, ‘The Growth and Failure of U.S.
Manufacturing Plants,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, pp. 671–698.
Entrepreneur, ‘Franchise 500,’ various years.
Ericson, R. and Pakes, A., 1995, ‘Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for
Empirical Work,’ Review of Economic Studies, 62, pp. 53–82.
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